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The Applicability of the Freedom of Information Act's
Disclosure Requirements to Intellectual Property
Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)t on
the principle that governmental decisions should be open to public
scrutiny2 and, therefore, individuals should have access to govern-
mental records.3 The FOIA requires federal agencies to publish cer-
tain information in the Federal Register4 and to disclose agency records
to any person who requests them.5 Generally, a federal agency must
determine whether it will comply with a request for records within
ten days of receiving the request.6 Persons whose requests are denied
may sue for disclosure in federal district courts. 7
Congress was aware that disclosure of certain types of informa-
tion might unduly harm those persons who submit the information to
federal agencies." Thus, the FOIA specifically exempts certain types
of information from mandatory disclosure.9 Despite these exemp-
tions the statute often serves less laudable purposes than those in-
tended by Congress. In the course of their regulatory function,
federal agencies acquire vast amounts of private data which may
then be disclosed, under the FOIA, to competitors, adversaries in liti-
gation, and others whose interests are contrary to those of the
1 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). The statute was originally enacted as the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966). It was amended by the 1974 Amendments
to the Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561-1564 (1974),
and by the Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1247 (1976).
2 The fundamental premise of the Act is that "the public has a right to know what its
Government is doing." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965).
3 The literature on the FOIA is extensive. The Duke Law Journal has published an an-
nual developments note since 1970. See 1981 DuKE L.J. 338; 1980 DuKE L.J. 139; 1979
DUKE L.J. 327; 1978 DuKE L.J. 189; 1977 DUKE L.J. 532; 1976 DUKE L.J. 366; 1975 DuKE
L.J. 416; 1974 DUKE L.J. 251; 1973 DuKE L.J. 178; 1972 DuKE L.J. 136; 1971 DUKE L.J. 164;
1970 DUKE L.J. 72. See also Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74
COLUM. L. REv. 895 (1974).
4 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1976).
5 Id § 552(a)(3).
6 Id § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1976).
7 Id § 552(a)(4)(B).
8 See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2418, 2427.
9 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). This section contains nine specific exemptions which have
been narrowly construed by the courts. See, e.g., Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S.
352, 366 (1976). Furthermore, the exemptions onlypenmit withholding, they do not require it.
Administrative discretion to disclose information which falls within one of the exemptions
was approved in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 290-94 (1979).
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submitter. '°
This note examines the issues which arise when private parties
submit patent or copyright information to federal agencies which are
subject to FOIA disclosure requests. Part I reviews the federal patent
and copyright systems; Part II analyzes whether patent applications
and copyrighted materials are "agency records" under the FOIA;
and Part III examines the extent to which the FOIA exemptions ap-
ply to patent and copyright information.
I. Ownership Rights in Intellectual Property
The rights of patent and copyright owners stem from the same
constitutional root. The Constitution grants Congress the power "to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries.""
Federal protection of intellectual property rights is based on two
principles. 12 First, the products of original and creative thought con-
fer a benefit upon society.' 3 Second, governmental protection is an
incentive to stimulate further creative thought. Thus, "[a] copyright,
like a patent, 'is at once the equivalent given by the public for bene-
fits bestowed by the genius and meditations and skill of individuals
and the incentive to further efforts for the same important
objects.' "14
Presently, two federal laws, the Patent Act' 5 and the Copyright
10 Freedom of Infonnation Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Proce-
dure ofthe Senate Comm. on theJudiiay, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-15 (1977) (statement of Gerald
P. Norton). Submitters may get relief from a potentially injurious disclosure by means of a
"reverse-FOIA" lawsuit, e.g. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). (Unlike ordinary
FOIA suits, which seek relief against the withholding of information, reverse-FOIA suits seek
relief against disclosure). See generaly Note, Protecting Confidential Business Informationfrom Federal
Agency Disclosure After Chg'sler Corp. v. Brown, 80 COLUM. L. Rev. 109 (1980).
11 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8. Under the acts of Congress giving effect to this constitu-
tional provision, the persons benefitted are divided into two classes - authors and inventors.
The monopoly granted to authors is termed a "copyright" and that given to inventors is
termed a "patent right." Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56 (1884).
12 B. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 9 (1967) [hereinaf-
ter cited as BUGBEE].
13 The test of "originality" has been applied to bar trademarks from the realm of intellec-
tual property. In 1879, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional certain statutory provisions
which attempted to base trademark protection upon the same clause in the Constitution
which had become the basis for the creation of patents and copyrights. The Court stated that
"neither originality, invention, discovery, science nor art is in any way essential ... " to es-
tablishing a trademark. Trade-Mark Cases 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
14 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
15 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976). Property in United States patents exist solely by virtue of
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Act, 16 protect intellectual property rights. A patent is a statutory
monopoly, in that the patent owner has the exclusive right to make,
use, or sell his invention.' 7 Although copyright also grants the copy-
right owner the exclusive right to reproduce, adapt, and publish cop-
ies of his artistic or literary work,' 8 the scope of statutory copyright
protection is much narrower than the scope of patent protection. 19
While the Copyright Act grants a copyright owner certain exclusive
rights, it also permits others limited use of copyrighted material with-
out liability for infringement.20
Patents may be obtained by anyone who "invents or discovers
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of
matter .... ,,2, Applicants are, generally, required to furnish a
description and a drawing of the invention 22 and some may have to
furnish a model exhibiting the several parts of their invention.23
Copyright may be secured on a variety of objects, from works of
art24 to maps 2 5 statuettes, 26 and religious shrines. 27 Ordinarily, two
complete copies of the work must be deposited in the Copyright Of-
fice.28 However, some three-dimensional works29 or secure tests30 are
the federal statute and the incidents of that property are defined entirely by federal law.
Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 403-404 (1963).
16 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976). In contrast to patent rights, which exist solely by virtue
of federal statute, there is a common-law copyright. It is, more accurately, a right of first
publication. Once a work is published, the owner's common-law protection is lost and any-
one may copy the work. Statutory copyright, on the other hand, requires publication and is a
monopolistic privilege of exclusive publication during a definite period of time. Common-law
copyright may be regulated by the states, but statutory copyright is regulated exclusively by
the federal government. Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 756-58, 345 P. 2d 546, 554-55
(1959).
17 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969).
18 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
19 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d. Cir. 1951); BUOBEE,
supra note 12, at 5.
20 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
21 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
22 Id §§ 111-113; 37 C.F.R. § 1.91 (1981).
23 35 U.S.C. § 114; 37 C.F.R. § 1.92.
24 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
25 Moore v. Lighthouse Publish. Co., 429 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ga. 1977). "Maps" in-
cludes all cartographic representations of area and three-dimensional works such as globes
and relief models. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c)(6) (1981).
26 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201(1954).
27 Allegrini v. DeAngelis, 59 F. Supp. 248 (D. Pa. 1944), afd, 149 F.2d 815 (3d Cir.
1945).
28 17 U.S.C. §§ 407(a), 408(b) (1976). Secton 407(a) requires that, with certain excep-
tions, a copyright owner shall deposit copies of the work for the Library of Congress. Deposit
is also required for registration of the copyright claim. However, registration is not a condi-
tion of copyright protection. Id § 408(a).
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exempt from the deposit requirement. It may also be possible to pro-
vide a photograph or other identifying reproduction in lieu of copies
of the work.31
In general, the statutory requirements for both patent and copy-
right applications are likely to result in federal agencies having pos-
session of private patent and copyright information. Since a federal
agency's possession of any materials subjects the materials to the
FOIA's disclosure requirements, the applicability of these require-
ments to patent and copyright information must be examined.
II. The Threshold Question: Are Patent and Copyright Materials
Agency Records?
Only "agency records" are subject to the FOIA's disclosure re-
quirements.3 2 Thus, the threshold question in every FOIA case is
whether a particular item is an agency record.33 If the item is deter-
mined to be a record, it may not be withheld unless it is specifically
exempted by one of the FOIA's exemptions. 34
29 Models illustrating scientific or technical information in three-dimensional form are
exempt from deposit. 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c)(1) (1981). Three-dimensional sculptural works
are also exempt. Id. § 202.19(c)(6). However, globes and other cartographic representations
of area are subject to deposit. Id.
30 A "secure test" is a nonmarketed test administered under supervision at specified cen-
ters on specific dates. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(b)(4) (1981). The law school or medical school
admission tests are examples. The Copyright Office will return the deposit of a secure test to
the copyright applicant after examining it. Id § 202.20(c)(2)(vi).
31 17 U.S.C. § 407(c) (1976); 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(d)(2) (1981).
32 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976).
33 This determination actually involves three questions: (1) What is a "record"; (2)
What is an "agency"; and (3) What relationship must exist between the record and the
agency for the information to be subject to the FOIA. See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169
(1980), for the Supreme Court's most recent analysis of these questions. Only the first ques-
tion requires special analysis relative to intellectual property. For general definitions of "rec-
ord," "agency," and "agency record," see Note, The Definition of "4geny Records" Under the
Freedom of Information Act, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1093 (1979).
34 The exemptions are set forth at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l)-(9) (1976). Section 552(c) pro-
vides that only information specifically exempted by one of the nine statutory exemptions
may be withheld. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that subsection (c) does not divest dis-
trict courts of their traditional power of equitable discretion. See Davis, The Information Act.- A
Prelimina9 Ana5ysir, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 767 (1967). A few early FOIA opinions held that
a district court was not compelled to grant equitable relief against an agency's withholding of
information not specifically exempted by the Act. See, e.g., GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 880
(9th Cir. 1969); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. VA, 301 F. Supp. 796, 806
(S.D.N.Y. 1969),appealdisrmissedas moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971). More recent cases have
held that, with regard to the FOIA, Congress has divested the judiciary of its power of equita-
ble discretion. See, e.g., County of Madison v. United States Dept. of Justice, 641 F.2d 1036,
1041 (st Cir. 1981); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1971). But see Theriault
v. United States, 503 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1974). Under the more prevalent view, once a
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Most materials requested under the FOIA are documents falling
within the ordinary usage of "records." However, because "records"
is not defined in the FOIA's text or its legislative history, the unique
characteristics of certain patent and copyrighted materials may pres-
ent special threshold problems. If "records" is limited to written doc-
uments, FOIA requests for intellectual property, such as films,
photographs, maps, and three-dimensional objects would not be sub-
ject to disclosure.
The cases which attempt to define a "record" under the FOIA
follow one of two different analytical approaches.3 5 One approach
has been definitional. In Nichols v. United States,36 a federal district
court found that certain physical objects associated with the assassi-
nation of President Kennedy were not records and, therefore, were
not subject to the FOIA's disclosure requirements. The court sup-
ported its conclusion by citing the dictionary definition of "record. '3 7
Generally, however, the courts using a definitional approach
have refused to limit "record" to its dictionary definition of some-
thing "written. 38 These courts have relied on the definition adopted
by the General Services Administration:
The term "records" means all books, papers, maps, photographs, or
other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or charac-
teristics, made or received. . . in connection with the transaction
of public business and preserved . . . as evidence of the organiza-
tion, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other
activities of the GSA or because of the informational value of the
data contained therein.3 9
court has determined that the requested material is an "agency record" and that it is not
protected by one of the statutory exemptions, it must mandate the agency's disclosure,
notwithstanding any equitable factors militating against disclosure. The only possible excep-
tion would be a case which raises "exceptional circumstances," such as "grave damage to the
national security." See County of Madison, v. United States Dept. of Justice, 641 F.2d at
1041 n. 6; Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See generall Note, The
Defmition of "Agency Records" Under the Freedom of Information Actr Threshold Requirement, 1978
B.Y.U. L. REv. 408, 427-33 [hereinafter cited as What Is a Record?]; Note, The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 895, 911-20 (1974).
35 See generally What Is a Record?, sutra note 34, at 412-22.
36 325 F. Supp. 130 (D. Kan. 1971), afl'don other grounds, 460 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972).
37 Id at 135. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY (1968) defines "record" as "anything that is writ-
ten down and preserved as evidence."
38 See, e.g., Save the Dolphins v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 404 F. Supp. 407,411
(N.D. Cal. 1975). The court stated that "[t]he term 'records'. .. includes various means of
storing information for future reference."
39 41 C.F.R. § 105-60.103(a) (1980). See, e.g., Save the Dolphin, 404 F. Supp. at 411, for a
judicial construction of "record" based on the GSA definition.
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Under this definition, the fact that patent and copyright information
is often contained in other than written documents should not cause
the information to be excluded from the FOIA's disclosure require-
ments. Nonetheless, a court applying a definitional approach proba-
bly would consider a three-dimensional object, such as a model, to be
outside the scope of the FOIA.40
The second analytical approach used in determining whether an
item is a "record" under the FOIA focuses upon whether public pol-
icy dictates that the agency disclose the item.41 In SCD Development
Corp. v. Mathews, 42 the court's definition of "record" turned on an
analysis of the FOIA's purpose.43 Under the definitional approach,
the tapes in SCD Development Corp. would clearly have been records. 44
Nonetheless, the court refused access to the tapes because public pol-
icy considerations did not support disclosure.45 The court stated:
There is ... a qualitative difference between the types of records
Congress sought to make available to the public by passing the
Freedom of Information Act and the library reference system
sought to be obtained here. The library material does not reflect
the structure, operation, or decision-making functions of the
agency, and where, as here, the materials are readily disseminated
to the public by the agency, the danger of agency secrecy which
Congress sought to alleviate is not a consideration. 46
In Weisberg v. United States Department of Justice,47 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that copyrighted materials were agency records under the FOIA be-
cause they "plainly reflect[ed] the operation, or decision-making
function of the agency."'48 The materials at issue in Weisberg were
40 It has been suggested that there is no justification for limiting the definition of
"records" on the basis of the physical characteristics of the requested materials. See Note, The
Defiition of "Agency Records" Under the Freedom of Information Act, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1095-
98 (1979).
41 See What Is a Record?, supra note 34, at 412-16 & 422-25.
42 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976).
43 Id at 1118-20.
44 The tapes were part of a service, the Medical Literature Analysis and Retrieval Sys-
tem (MEDLARS), offered by the National Library of Medicine. Public access to the MED-
LARS data bank was available through the National Library's on-line computer terminal.
At the time of the lawsuit, 350 institutions subscribed to the service. Subscribers were gener-
ally required to provide members of the public with access to the system at a set hourly rate.
A copy of the tapes could be purchased for $50,000. Id at 1117-18.
45 Id at 1118-20.
46 Id at 1120.
47 631 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
48 Id at 828. The We&herg decision is limited to the holding that copyrighted materials
are subject to the FOIA. The decision does not resolve the question of whether a FOIA
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photographs taken at the scene of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s assassi-
nation. TIME, Inc. had copyrighted the photographs before submit-
ting them to the FBI for use in the assassination investigation.49 The
D. C. Circuit distinguished SDC Development Corp. on the grounds
that the photographs would permit public evaluation of the FBI's
investigation of the King assassination. Furthermore, while in SDC
Development Corp. dissemination of the tapes was assured by Congres-
sional mandate, in Weisberg, TIME, Inc. had no obligation to grant
public access to the photographs, even though it had made copies of
the photographs available to the FBI. Therefore, absent a FOIA dis-
closure, there was no guarantee that the photographs would be avail-
able to the public.50 The court in Weisberg explicitly rejected a
definitional approach excluding all copyrighted materials from the
reach of the FOIA. The court stated: "Interpreting the FOIA as the
Government urges would allow an agency to mask its processess or
functions from public scrutiny simply by asserting a third party's
copyright."'5
The public policy approach followed in Wea'berg permits greater
flexibility than the definitional approach when assessing the FOIA's
applicability to copyrighted materials.52 In cases where none of the
FOIA's exemptions apply to the requested materials, the public pol-
icy approach may provide a principled rationale for denying a poten-
tially inequitable disclosure which would be required under the
definitional approach.53 This may be illustrated by SDC Development
request for copyrighted material may be properly granted. Instead of deciding this question,
Judge Bazelon remanded the case for the district court to seek joinder of TIME, Inc., which
claimed copyright in the requested materials. Id at 831. On remand, TIME, Inc. withdrew
its objections to the FBI providing Weisberg with prints of the photographs. Letter from
Harry M. Johnston, Associate General Counsel to the Department of Justice (Aug. 13, 1980).
49 Id at 825.
50 Id at 827-28.
51 Id at 828.
52 See generaly What Is a Record?, supra note 34, at 422-25.
53 Some federal agencies have adopted a restrictive definition of "records", as part of
their FOIA regulations, which may serve to exclude patent and copyright information as
"valuable property." For example, the Department of the Navy regulations state:
[T]he term "record(s)" does not include objects or articles such as structures, furni-
ture, paintings, sculpture, three-dimensional models, vehicles, equipment, etc.,
whatever their historical value or value as "evidence." Formula, designs, drawings,
research data, computer programs, technical data packages, etc., are not considered
"records" within the Congressional intent of 5 U.S.C. 552, even though maintained
in documentation form. Because of development costs, utilization, or value, these
items are considered property, not preserved for informational value nor as evi-
dence of agency functions, but as exploitable resources to be utilized in the best
interest of all the public. Requests for copies of such material shall be evaluated in
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Corp. , 54which did not involve a request for intellectual property. In
that case, a definitional approach would have required disclosure of
the tapes as agency records to which no statutory exemption applied.
However, disclosure of the tapes would have significantly harmed the
National Library of Medicine program. By using the public policy
approach, the court avoided the potential harm which the defini-
tional approach would have caused to an outside interest.
The public policy approach may also require a FOIA disclosure
of intellectual property which does not fit the traditional definition of
"records." 55 This may be illustrated by Nichols,5 6 which also did not
involve a request for intellectual property. In that case, the court
might have permitted access to the coat and shirt worn by President
Kennedy at the time of his assassination and to metal fragments re-
moved from the President's brain on the grounds that the FOIA's
underlying policies would be effectuated by disclosure of the
materials.
The public policy approach does have its disadvantages. First,
it expands the limited role which Congress assigned to the courts in
the administration of the FOIA. The public policy approach permits
the courts to add a judicially created exemption to the specific statu-
tory exemptions.5 7 Second, the public policy approach may mask the
accordance with policies expressly directed to the appropriate dissemination or use
of such property. Requests to inspect such material to determine its content for
informational purposes shall normally be granted, however, unless inspection is in-
consistent with the obligation to protect the property value of the material, as, for
example, may be true for certain formula.
32 C.F.R. § 701.4 (1981). See also 32 C.F.R. § 806.6(h) (1981) (Air Force); 45 C.F.R. § 5.5
(1980) (HEW). The disadvantage of such restrictive definitions is that they permit federal
agencies a degree of discretion which might more appropriately be exercised by a federal
district court. See note 57 and accompanying text, infa. It is also questionable whether the
adoption of a restrictive definition of "records" by federal agencies is consistent with the
FOIA's purpose of maximum disclosure.
54 See notes 42-46 and accompanying text, supra.
55 See general'y Note, The Definition of "4gency Records" Underthe Freedom of Information Act, 31
STAN. L. REv. 1093, 1095-1098 (1979).
56 See notes 36-37 and accompanying text, supra.
57 The public policy approach involves a partial return to an equitable discretion doc-
trine, based upon a court's inherent power to issue injunctions. Strong arguments have been
made for and against the judicial exercise of equitable discretion in FOIA cases. See Rose v.
Dept. of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 269 (2d Cir. 1974), a'd 425 U.S. 352 (1976); see also note 34
supra. There have been two main objections to the exercise of judicial equitable discretion.
First, the statute and its legislative history have been interpreted to deny the courts any right
to refuse injunctive relief on grounds other than those specifically stated in the statute. Cases
denying the existence of equitable discretion rely upon 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1976) and upon the
Senate report which states: "The purpose of this subsection is to make it clear beyond doubt
that all materials. . . are to be made available. . . unless explicitly allowed to be kept secret
[February 19821
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true issue. While purporting to define "record" under the FOIA, the
court is actually balancing the considerations for and against disclo-
sure.5 8 Nonetheless, the public policy approach has much to recom-
mend it where important private interests are involved. In such a
situation, a mechanical application of the FOIA may lead to an
inequitable result which could be avoided by a policy based analysis.
Where the requested materials have been determined to be
agency records under the FOIA, the second step is ascertaining
whether the records are exempted from mandatory disclosure under
one of the nine statutory exemptions.59 Persons wishing to protect
intellectual property from disclosure have most frequently invoked
Exemptions 3 and 4.
III. FOIA Exemptions: Applicability to Disclosures of
Intellectual Property
A. FOIA Exemption 3
Exemption 3 exempts from mandatory disclosure matters for
which another federal statute mandates nondisclosure to the public.
The other federal statute must either (A) give an agency no discre-
tion regarding withholding certain matters from the public; or (B) it
must establish specific criteria for withholding or refer to particular
matters which must be withheld.60
When Congress amended Exemption 3 in 1976,61 the exemption
protected material "specifically exempted from disclosure by stat-
ute."'62 By amending the exemption, Congress legislatively overruled
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in FAA v.
Robertson.63 In Robertson, the Court had applied Exemption 3 to a
by one of the exemptions. . ." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1965). Similar
language is found in the House report. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted
in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2418, 2429. However, the House report also states
that a court "will have authority whenever it considers such action equitable and appropriate
to enjoin the agency from withholding its records .. " H.R. REP. at 9, [1966] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2426. The Senate report is generally considered the more reliable
indicator of legislative intent. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 679 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The second objection to the exercise ofjudicial discretion is the fear that the policies furthered
by the Act will be frustrated if federal agencies and the courts are not given definite guide-
lines for withholding. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1965). See general4 What Isa
Record?, supra note 34, at 427-32
58 See generally What Is a Record., supra note 34, at 423-25.
59 The exemptions are set forth at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1976).
60 Id § 552(b)(3).
61 Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1247 (1976).
62 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970).
63 422 U.S. 255 (1975). The Conference Committee report on the final version of the
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federal statute which gave an agency director complete discretion to
withhold information if he deemed it to be in the public's interest. 64
In the 1976 amendment, Congress emphasized that FOIA exemp-
tions were to be legislative, not administrative decisions.65 The pres-
ent version of Exemption 3 does permit some administrative
discretion, but only if the subject statute either provides specific crite-
ria for withholding or refers to particular matters to be withheld.66
B. The Applicabili of FOIA Exemption 3 to the Patent Act
FOIA requests for patent materials have centered on patent ap-
plications and Patent Office decisions regarding these applications. 67
Patent applications may be grouped into three categories: (1) pend-
ing applications under consideration by the Patent Office; (2) patent
files or applications that have culminated in the issuance of a patent;
and (3) abandoned applications, for which the Patent Office has ter-
minated proceedings without issuing a patent. 6 Section 122 of the
Patent Act provides:
Applications for patents shall be kept in confidence by the Patent
Office and no information concerning the same given without the
authority of the applicant or owner unless necessary to carry out
the provisions of any Act of Congress or in such special circum-
stances as may be determined by the Commissioner.69
Patent Office regulations promulgated under section 122 explicitly
grant secrecy to pending applications. 70 Because abandoned applica-
tions may be reactivated at a later time,7t the regulations provide
1976 amendments states: "The conferees intend this language to overrule the decision of the
Supreme Court in Administrator, FAA v. Robertson .... " H.R. REP. No. 1441, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 25, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2183, 2250. See generally Note, The
Effect of the 1976 Amendment to Exemption Three of the Freedom of Information Act, 76 COLUM. L.
REv. 1029 (1976).
64 The statute, the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970), provided that upon
the objection of "[a]ny person," the appropriate officials "shall order such information with-
held from public disclosure when, in their judgment, a disclosure of such information would
adversely affect the interests of such person and is not required in the interest of the public."
65 H.R. REP. No. 880, Part I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2183, 2205.
66 See Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1075 (1980); Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Kreps, 577 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1073 (1979); American Jewish Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
67 See Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d at 1215; Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Kreps, 577 F.2d
at 610; Sears v. Gottschalk, 502 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
68 Sears v. Gottschalk, 502 F.2d at 124.
69 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1976).
70 37 C.F.R. § 1.14(a) (1981).
71 35 U.S.C. § 133 (1976); 37 C.F.R. § 1.137 (1981).
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that they are also not available to the public. 72 Since patent files
have resulted in the issuance of a patent, confidentiality is no longer
required. Therefore, patent files are available for public inspection
and copying.73
Prior to 1976, the Patent Act, section 122, was considered to be
an exempting statute74 under FOIA Exemption 3.75 After the 1976
amendment to Exemption 3, however, it was not clear whether sec-
tion 122 satisfied the more stringent requirements of the amended
version. Recently, both the Ninth Circuit 76 and the D.C. Circuit 77
have held that section 122 is a statute which meets the criteria of
Exemption 3 of the FOIA.
Both circuits recognized that section 122 of the Patent Act 78
does not satisfy subsection A of Exemption 3 because it does not re-
quire nondisclosure in such a way as to leave the Patent Office no
discretion on the issue. Section 122 specifically permits the Commis-
sioner to release information concerning patent applications under
"special circumstances." However, the presence of limited adminis-
trative discretion does not disqualify section 122 from Exemption 3.
Both courts held that, by referring to patent applications and infor-
mation concerning those applications, section 122 satisfies subsection
B's requirement that an exempting statute refer to "particular types
of matters to be withheld. '79
Both courts indicated that, unlike the statute in Robertson,80 sec-
tion 122 does not authorize broad withholding discretion by the Pat-
ent Office. Section 122 merely provides for the confidentiality of
patent applications in order to prevent the frustration of the patent
laws which would result from public disclosure of patent applications
prior to the issuance of a patent.,
Both the Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit were unwilling to
72 37 C.F.R. § 1.14(b) (1981).
73 IM § 1.11(a).
74 An "exempting statute" is a statute which meets the requirements of Exemption 3 of
the FOIA.
75 See, e.g., Sears v. Gottschalk, 502 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1974), cerl. denied, 425 U.S. 904
(1976).
76 Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Kreps, 577 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073
(1979).
77 Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1075
(1980).
78 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1976).
79 Irons & Sears, 606 F.2d at 1220-21; Lee Pharmaceuticals, 577 F.2d at 616-17. Since
Exemption 3 is phrased in the disjunctive, it is sufficient if either subsection A or B is satisfied.
80 422 U.S. 255 (1975); See notes 63-66 and accompanying text supra.
81 Irons & Sears, 606 F.2d at 1220-22; Lee Pharmaceuticals, 577 F.2d at 616-17.
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impute to Congress an intent to eliminate the traditional confidenti-
ality accorded to patent applications.8 2 Writing for the D.C. Circuit,
Chief Judge J. Skelly Wright stated:
There can be little doubt that a holding permitting FOIA access to
such applications Would jeopardize the patent system by permitting
competitors to divine or actually to secure information concerning
inventions prior to the issuance of a patent. Indeed, were such ac-
cess routinely to be permitted would-be applicants might be de-
terred from seeking patent protection in the first place. The need
for confidentiality . . . seems close to the core of the patent
system.83
C. The Applicability of FOIA Exemption 3 to the Copyright Act
Despite its constitutional kinship to the Patent Act, 84 the Copy-
right Act8 5 evidences much less concern than the Patent Act for the
confidentiality of intellectual property.8 6 The Copyright Act con-
tains no specific provisions for withholding copyright information as
required by FOIA Exemption 3. Nonetheless, the argument has been
made87 that the requirements of Exemption 3 are met by the Copy-
right Act, section 106,88 which grants copyright owners the exclusive
right to reproduce, distribute for sale, or publicly display copyrighted
works. In the only case to decide the issue, Weisberg v. United States
Department ofJustice,89 the federal district court found that section 106
does not satisfy Exemption 3 of the FOIA. The court held that sec-
tion 106 does not require that copyrighted materials be withheld
from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion to the
agency; it does not provide specific criteria for withholding; and it
does not refer to particular types of matters to be withheld. Thus,
the court found that section 106 satisfies neither subsections A nor B
of Exemption 3.90
The court's determination in Weisberg that copyrighted materi-
82 606 F.2d at 1221; 577 F.2d at 616.
83 606 F.2d at 1221.
84 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976).
85 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976).
86 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951).
87 Brief for Appellant at 29-39, Weisberg v. United States Dept. of Justice, 631 F.2d 824
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
88 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
89 No. 75-1996 (D.D.C., Feb. 9, 1978). The appellate court opinion is at 631 F.2d 824
(D.C. Cir. 1980) and is discussed at notes 47-51 and accompanying text supra.
90 No. 75-1996 at 5-6. Although the Wezisberg court did not address the issue, it is possible
that Section 106 would have satisfied the pre-1976 version of Exemption 3.
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als are "records" and not subject to Exemption 391 was sufficient to
dispose of the case. However, in requiring disclosure of the copy-
righted materials requested by the plaintiff, the court also relied on
the "fair use" doctrine. Courts have long recognized a "fair use" de-
fense to a copyright infringement claim 92 and Congress has incorpo-
rated the "fair use" doctrine into the Copyright Act.9 3 The court in
Weisberg concluded that the use would be "fair" because the plaintiff
intended to use the copyrighted materials for scholarly purposes and
because the effect of plaintiff's use on the "potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work" would not be substantial. 94
The application of the "fair use" doctrine to FOIA requests for
copyrighted information would appear to "offer a means of balanc-
ing the exclusive right of a copyright owner with the public's interest
in the dissemination of information affecting areas of universal con-
cern such as art, science, history, or industry." 95 The balancing of
interests in Weisberg weighed in favor of the public's interest in the
dissemination of the copyrighted information. The requested materi-
als were copyrighted photographs of the Martin Luther King assassi-
nation which were of great historical interest to the general public.
Moreover, the plaintiff's intended use of the photographs for schol-
arly purposes would have an inconsequential effect upon the photo-
graphs' value to the copyright owner, TIME, Inc.96 Thus, the "fair
use" doctrine, developed as a defense to copyright infringement
91 The court indicated that it was "loathe to analyze in any depth" the application of
Exemption 3 to the requested materials "because less than $30 is at stake." No. 75-1996 at 5.
In St. Paul's Benev. Educ. and Missionary Inst. v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 822, 830 (N.D.
Ga. 1980), the court engaged in even less analysis. It merely stated that the Copyright Act
does not meet the standard of Exemption 3. Thus, there are presently no in-depth judicial
analyses of the application of Exemption 3 to copyright information.
92 See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1013 (1978).
93 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976) is a codification of the "fair use" doctrine. Id Section 107 lists
the factors to be considered in determining the applicability of the "fair use" defense. These
are:
"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work."
94 No. 75-1996 at 5-6.
95 Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978).
96 No. 75-1996 at 1-3. See also Weisberg v. United States Dept. of Justice, 631 F.2d 824,
825-27 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Had TIME's commercial interest in the photographs been seriously
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claims, appears to provide an appropriate standard for reaching an
equitable result in FOIA disputes over copyrighted materials. In
those circumstances in which the intended use would be considered
"fair' in a copyright infringement action, the application of the "fair
use" doctrine would support disclosure of the copyrighted material.
Despite its apparent persuasiveness, there are a number of
problems with this analysis. First, the application of the "fair use"
criteria requires an assessment of the requester's use of the informtion
and its effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work. Such
an inquiry presents practical difficulties for federal officials who
make the initial determination of whether to copy materials re-
quested under the FOIA. 97 It is also impermissible for agencies and
reviewing courts to ascertain the requester's purpose. Particular
members of the public may not claim any special right of access to
public records. Either the material is statutorily exempt from disclo-
sure or, absent an applicable exemption, all persons are entitled to
equal access to it.98 Thus, a requester's intended "fair use" should
not give him a particular privilege to receive the copyrighted
material.
The second problem with the application of the "fair use" doc-
trine to FOIA requests is that it is not a sufficient rationale to support
withholding copyrighted material when the balancing of interests
weighs in favor of the copyright owner's exclusive rights in the re-
quested materials. When the intended use would not be considered
"fair" in a copyright infringement action, the court's analysis in Wez-
berg would suggest withholding of the copyrighted material. How-
ever, this result would present an analytical problem, in that a
number of courts have found that they lack the equitable discretion
to withhold information on nonstatutory grounds.99 To refuse to en-
join a FOIA disclosure, a court must either determine that the re-
threatened, it would not have offered to sell copies to Weisberg at ten dollars per print. Id at
826.
97 One solution is for agency officials to permit examination of copyrighted materials.
See, e.g., Dept. of Navy regulations, 32 C.F.R. § 701.4 (1981), supra note 53. Any person
copying the material would personally assume liability for copyright infringement. See Texas
Attorney General's Opinion, COPYRIGHT LAW DECISIONS (CCH) 1 25247 (March 18, 1981).
An accompanying warning of copyright, similar to the notice used by libraries and archives,
would also be advisable. See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1976); 37 C.F.R. § 201.14 (1981).
98 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976) provides that if the request is proper, the records shall be
available to "any person." It has been construed to mean that neither the requester's identity
nor the reasons for the request may be considered in determining whether disclosure is re-
quired. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10 (1975); Robles v. EPA
484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973).
99 See, e.g., County of Madison v. United States Dept. of Justice, 641 F.2d 1036, 1041 (1st
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quested material is not an agency record or that one of the statutory
exemptions applies. Thus, the "fair use" doctrine alone will not sup-
port withholding copyrighted material even though, under the same
circumstances, the "fair use" defense would fail in a copyright in-
fringement action.
In Association of American Medical Colleges v. Carey, 00 a recent case
not brought under the FOIA, the plaintiff sought a preliminary in-
junction against being required to comply with New York's "truth in
testing" law and file copies of its copyrighted Medical College Ad-
mission Test (MCAT) because it would suffer serious harm to its pro-
prietary interest in the test. The defendants argued that the "fair
use" defense applied since the disclosure requirements of New York's
testing law were intended to make testing agencies more publicly
accountable. 101
In granting the preliminary injunction, the district court focused
upon the potential harm that disclosure would cause to the value of
the MCAT.10 2 If the American Medical Colleges case had been brought
under the FOIA, it would probably have presented the type of situa-
tion in which equity would suggest withholding the requested mater-
ials. However, because the Weisberg analysis would be insufficient
authority to permit withholding, the court would have had to either
determine that the requested materials were not "agency records"'0 3
or apply a statutory exemption other than Exemption 3. FOIA Ex-
emption 4 may provide a court with an alternative grounds for deci-
sion under these circumstances.
D. The Applicability of FOJA Exemption 4 to Copyright Information
Exemption 4 exempts from mandatory disclosure matters that
are "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
Cir. 1981); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Seealso note 35 supra for a
discussion of the judicial power to exercise equitable discretion in FOIA cases.
100 482 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
101 Id at 1364-66.
102 Id at 1367-68. The MOAT is used for purposes of medical school admissions. As a
"secure" test, it is controlled by either the sponsor or the publisher, who administers it at
specified test centers on specific dates. 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(b)(4) (1981). See note 30supra for a
description of the Copyright Office's deposit requirements for secure tests.
103 A court taking a definitional approach to the "record" question would almost cer-
tainly have found the MOAT to be an agency record. However, a policy approach might
have yielded a different result. See notes 36-58 and accompanying text supra for a discussion
of how the two judicial approaches to the "record" question affect FOIA requests for copy-
righted materials.
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from a person and privileged or confidential."' 0 4 A few courts origi-
nally construed Exemption 4 as protecting three different types of
agency records: trade secrets, commercial or financial information,
and privileged or confidential information. 0 5 More courts now take
the position that "privileged or confidential" does not provide a dis-
tinct category of exempt information, rather it modifies "commercial
or financial information."' 0 6 Under the majority rule, copyrighted
information would have to be both commercial in nature and privi-
leged 0 7 or confidential to qualify under Exemption 4.
The test for confidentiality was set forth in National Parks and
Conservation Association v. Morton. ' s Under the Morton test, informa-
tion will be deemed "confidential" when disclosure would "impair
the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the fu-
ture" or "cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the
person from whom the information was obtained."' 0 9
The only judicial determination of whether Exemption 4 applies
to copyrighted materials was in Weisberg v. United States Department of
Justice."10 The court in Weisberg found that the copyrighted photo-
graphs in the case were neither "commercial or financial informa-
tion" nor "confidential."''' The court conceded "that among the
legislative purposes underlying use of the term 'confidential' is avoid-
ance of any impairment of the 'Government's ability to obtain neces-
104 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4) (1976).
105 See, e.g., Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967), in
which the court exempted confidential information without looking to its financial or com-
mercial nature. The disjunctive construction of Exemption 4 is based on certain language in
the House and Senate reports which suggests that the House committee which drafted the bill
recognized a self-contained category of exempt confidential or privileged information. See
generally Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48
TEx. L. REv. 1261, 1262-70 (1970).
106 See, e.g. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. v. VA, 301 F. Supp. 796, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436
F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971). The Getman court stated that the disjunctive interpretation "tor-
tures the plain meaning of Exemption 4." 450 F.2d at 673.
107 The courts have not been called upon to define "privileged." The term has apparently
been interpreted by federal agencies and by FOIA requesters as referring to the privileges
traditionally recognized at common law. See 88 HARV. L. REV. 470, 473 (1974).
108 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
109 Id at 770. Prior to Morton, information was considered "confidential" if it would "cus-
tomarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained." Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Under this test, copyrighted material
of a commercial nature would probably have been withheld. However, the Morton standard is
stricter.
110 No. 75-1996 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 1978). See notes 89-99 and accompanying text supra for a
discussion of the Weisberg court's analysis of Exemption 3 as applied to copyrighted materials.
111 Id at 6-7.
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sary information in the future.' 1112 But, since the FBI could have
subpoenaed the photographs as part of its investigatory function, the
court concluded that there was no danger that disclosure would im-
pair the Government's ability to obtain the information in the
future. 1 3
Because the photographs had little commercial value to the
copyright holder, 1 4 the court reached the correct result in finding
that they were not within Exemption 4. However, the court's analy-
sis failed to do justice to the potentially important private property
interests involved in a FOIA request for copyrighted materials. Al-
though the photographs in Weisberg were properly not characterized
as "commercial," certain copyrighted materials, such as the MCAT
in American Medical Colleges"I5 might well be deemed "commercial.","16
Futhermore, apart from ensuring that government officials have ac-
cess to information, the Morton" 7 court's definition of "confidential"
is designed to protect persons who submit commercial information to
government officials from the competitive disadvantages of disclo-
sure. Although the facts in Weisberg did not require it, a thorough
analysis of the application of Exemption 4 to copyrighted material
must recognize the "twofold justification for the exemption of com-
mercial material: (1) encouraging cooperation by those who are not
obligated to provide information to the government and (2) protect-
ing the rights of those who must." 118
When applied to a FOIA request for copyrighted information,
the impact of Exemption 4 is analogous to the impact of the "fair
use" doctrine in copyright infringement actions.1 9 Under the Morton
test, the copyrighted information will be deemed confidential and
exempt from the FOIA's mandatory disclosure if it is of a commercial
nature and if disclosure will cause substantial harm to the competi-
112 Id
113 Id at 7.
114 See note 96 supra.
115 See notes 100-102 and accompanying text supra.
116 WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY (1968) defines "commercial" as "made or done primarily for
sale or profit." The only judicial definition of "commercial" is by way of dictum in Washing-
ton Research Project, Inc. v. Dept. of HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 244 n. 6 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The
court indicated that an organization "engaged in profit-oriented research, or a non-profit
organization that engages in profit-making ventures based on. . . [academic] research, could
• . . have a commercial or trade interest. . . ." in a scientific research design. However, the
court refused to accept the Government's proposition that mere "ideas are a researcher's
'stock-in-trade'" and are, therefore, commercial information. Id at 244.
117 498 F.2d at 768.
118 Id at 769.
119 See notes 92-94 and accompanying text s.upra for a discussion of the "fair use" doctrine.
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tive position of the copyright owner. Similarly, an unauthorized use
of a copyrighted work will generally not be deemed a "fair use" if it
has an adverse effect "upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. ' 120 Thus, the proper analysis of a FOIA request
for copyrighted materials is to apply Exemption 4. Although a mere
claim of copyright is not sufficient to justify withholding under Ex-
emption 3 of the FOIA, Exemption 4 provides statutory protection
for copyrighted materials in situations analogous to those in which
the Copyright Act recognizes a copyright infringement.
IV. Conclusion
The application of the FOIA's disclosure requirements to pri-
vate interests in intellectual property is consistent with the general
requirements of patent and copyright law. The need for confidenti-
ality is close to the core of the patent system. Thus, because of a
specific provision in the Patent Act mandating confidentiality, pat-
ent applications and related materials are exempt from mandatory
disclosure under Exemption 3 of the FOIA. In keeping with the nar-
rower scope of statutory protection for copyrights, the Copyright Act
does not contain any provisions which meet the test of Exemption 3
of the FOIA. Thus, that exemption is not available to protect copy-
righted materials from mandatory disclosure. However, if disclosure
of copyright information would have a substantially adverse effect
upon a copyright owner's property interest, a court may refuse to
enjoin disclosure on the basis of Exemption 4 of the FOIA.
Exemption 4 is designed to protect certain types of commercial
information from mandatory disclosure. Its impact upon a FOIA re-
quest for copyrighted materials is analogous to the effect of the "fair
use" doctrine in copyright infringement actions. In those situations
in which there would be little impairment of a copyright owner's po-
tential market for the copyrighted work, the "fair use" doctrine
would permit limited unauthorized use of the material without lia-
bility for copyright infringement. Similarly, Exemption 4 would not
protect the copyrighted material from mandatory disclosure if such
disclosure would not cause undue harm to the economic position of
the copyright owner. Conversely, if an unauthorized use would have
an adverse effect upon the economic value of a copyright owner's
work, it would generally not be deemed "fair" in a copyright in-
fringement action. Similarly, Exemption 4 would also protect the
120 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1976).
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copyrighted material from mandatory disclosure if it became the
subject of a FOIA request.
In addition to applying either the third or fourth statutory ex-
emptions, where policy considerations militate against disclosure of
intellectual property, a court may achieve maximum flexibility by
adopting a restrictive definition of "agency records." Thereby, it
may be possible to altogether remove the requested material from the
scope of the FOIA.
Renee G Rabinowitz
